



Three Flaws in One Justification

A Critical Examination of Nussbaum's Reasoning Behind Her List of Capabilities

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Abstract: Who should decide what makes one's life good? This is a long-standing question that has recently led to an unresolved discussion between two leading figures of the contemporary political and social theory, namely Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. In this discussion, addressing the adverse effects of unjust social conditions on people's choices such as the problem of adaptive preferences, Nussbaum proposes a philosophically-informed list of aspects of the good life developed from a particular normative account. However, the reasoning behind her proposal, I argue, involves three flaws that appear due to absence of a sociologically-informed account of people's choices. First, considering that unjust social conditions can adversely affect not only people's choice on aspects of good life, but also their choices in achieving these aspects, developing a list from a philosophical account of the good life cannot be a solution against these adverse effects. Second, Nussbaum excessively generalises her findings based on data involving quite a limited number of disadvantaged women in a way that her findings are applicable to all disadvantaged people living in varied social settings. Third, both existing empirical evidences and the qualitative data I collected in three distinct settings of Turkey demonstrate that disadvantaged people are not necessarily those who, as Nussbaum implicitly addresses, are unable to develop sophisticated/reasoned judgements on their material conditions, but might be those who must have developed the ability of deliberately adapting their preferences to make a living within given structural inequalities.

Keywords: Capability approach, adaptive preferences, false-consciousness, structural inequalities, disadvantage.

Öz: İyi hayatın unsurlarına kim karar vermeli? Uzun süredir gündemde olan bu soru çağdaş siyasal ve sosyal teorinin önde gelen iki ismi arasında gösterilen Amartya Sen ve Martha Nussbaum arasında henüz çözümlenememiş bir tartışmayı doğurmuştur. Bu tartışmada Nussbaum, uyarlanmış tercihler gibi adil olmayan sosyal koşulların birey seçimleri üzerindeki olumsuz etkilerine işaret ederek, normatif bir iyi hayat tanımına dayanan ve felsefi temelde oluşturulmuş bir değerli işlevler listesi önermektedir. Fakat bu çalışma, Nussbaum'un önerisinin ardında yatan gerekçenin birey tercihlerinin oluşumunun sosyolojik arka planını göz ardı etmesinden dolayı üç aşında sorunlu olduğunu tartışmaktadır. Birincisi, adil olmayan sosyal koşullar, bireyleri sadece bir hayati iyi yapan değerli işlevleri belirlemek konusunda değil ama aynı zamanda söz konusu işlevleri gerçekleştirme için tercih etmek konusunda da olumsuz etkileyebilir. Bu durum göz önüne alındığında, bir hayati iyi yapan değerli işlevlerin belirlenmesinde birey tercihlerini yok sayarak, bu işlevlerin felsefi bir bakış açısıyla dışarıdan belirlenmesi adil olmayan sosyal koşulların birey tercihleri üzerindeki olumsuz etkisini ortadan kaldırmayacaktır. İkincisi, Nussbaum, oldukça sınırlı sayıdaki dezavantajlı kadın ile yaptığı görüşmelerin bulgularının bütün dezavantajlı bireyler için geçerli olabileceği şeklinde oldukça genelleme bir tutum geliştirmektedir. Üçüncüsü, hem ilgili literatürde hâlihazırda görgül veriler hem de Türkiye'nin üç farklı sosyal bağlamında bu çalışma amacıyla toplanan veriler göstermektedir ki dezavantajlı bireyler, Nussbaum'un üstü kapalı olarak ima ettiği gibi, her zaman maddi koşullara ilişkin olarak çok yönlü düşünmebilme/akıl yürütme yeteneğinden yoksun bireyler değiller; fakat verili yapısal eşitsizlikler dolayısıyla, tercihlerini içinde buldukları koşullara uyarlama yeteneği geliştirmek zorunda olan bireyler olabilmekteler.

Anahtar Kavramlar: Yapabilirlikler yaklaşımı, uyarlanmış tercihler, yanlış bilinç, yapısal eşitsizlikler, dezavantaj.

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Introduction¹

As a new evaluative framework that has attracted ample interest from various fields of research involving social justice, inequalities, poverty and social welfare, the capability approach has initially been developed by Amartya Sen; yet political philosopher Martha Nussbaum is today also widely acknowledged as a prominent scholar who has played an innovative and leading role in both advancing and advocating the approach. Positioned within the liberal-egalitarian tradition, but refusing existing normative theories that evaluate (dis)advantage based on resource ownership, both Sen and Nussbaum have advocated that people's ability to achieve a good life should be the primary space of evaluation in assessing well-being, poverty, inequality and justice, or goodness of institutional arrangements. However, who should identify what makes one's life good, or aspects/dimensions of the good life, is a question that has led to a long-lasting disagreement between Sen and Nussbaum. On the one hand, Sen deliberately avoids specifying dimensions of what makes one's life good, except for stressing the significance of certain basic dimensions such as having shelter, freedom of movement, being clothed and having access to food (see Sen, 1979, p.218; 2004, p.78; 2005, p.158). This has become known as the *deliberate incompleteness* of Sen's capability approach, where he advances various reasons to justify this deliberate incompleteness and advocates that people themselves should decide what makes their life good rather than specifying dimensions of a good life from a transcendental philosophical account. On the other hand, Nussbaum claims that Sen's conception of freedom, or capability, is too vague. According to her, if the capability approach has anything to say about, for example, (in)justice, then it must specify dimensions of the good life. Her foundational criticism of Sen's capability approach rests on the idea that people's preferences in valuing a being or doing can be distorted by unjust social conditions such as patriarchal norms and/or social traditions. In her discussion, this is mostly referred to in relation to the question of *adaptive preferences* in a way akin to the concept of false-consciousness. Underlining influences of unjust social conditions that distort people's preferences and eventually lead them to value something against their true interests, Nussbaum proposes to specify dimensions of the good life from a philosophical point extrinsic to people's own lives. Thus, drawing on an interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of human dignity (see Nussbaum,

1 This work is a revised, extended, and re-structured form of an argument from my Ph.D. thesis that I completed in the University of Manchester/UK. I appreciate for constructive criticisms and suggestions from my supervisors, namely James Nazroo, Wendy Bottero, as well as my viva examiners Nicholas Thoburn and Mesut Yeğen. I should also thank to valuable comments and rightful criticisms from anonymous referees who kindly accepted to assess this piece for the Journal of Humanity and Society.

2000, pp.72-74; 2003, p.40), she specifies 10 dimensions from a transcendental philosophical account and claims they are cross-culturally valuable for everyone on earth.

In this work, I critically evaluate Nussbaum's perspective by addressing three flaws in her reasoning behind the argument that valuable beings and doings, or functionings², should be specified from a transcendental philosophical account extrinsic to people's own lives. After briefly identifying Sen and Nussbaum's positions as well as their reasonings, I first discuss that Nussbaum's reasoning is flawed since it involves a tacit assumption that unjust social conditions are influential on people's choices of valuable beings and doings, but not on their choices in achieving valuable functionings. Second, drawing on some of Nussbaum's works, I suggest that she has a particular conception of adaptive preferences as one's inability to develop sophisticated/reasoned judgements or critical reflection on what makes a person's life good. However, addressing some existing empirical research, I underline that disadvantaged individuals can also be able to make sophisticated/reasoned judgements and discuss that Nussbaum overgeneralizes her findings derived from her own research as they are applicable for all disadvantaged people. Lastly, drawing on some of the existing research in this area along with empirical data collected through qualitative deep-interviews, I argue that it is constraining and unjust structural conditions that lead disadvantaged people to adapt their preferences, but not the absence of ability to develop sophisticated/reasoned judgements on material conditions. In other words, I argue that disadvantaged people are not necessarily those who lack sophisticated/reasoned judgements, or those who have false-consciousness concerning their best interests; but they are in some cases those who must have developed the ability of deliberately adapting their preferences in line with constraining conditions with the purpose of making a living within the unjust structural relations.

From the Deliberate Incompleteness to the Aristotelian Conception of a Good Life

The capability approach is considered as an evaluative framework advocating that the just society is the one in which people are able to achieve valuable beings and doings. This crude definition of the capability approach takes more nuanced and slightly different forms in works of its prominent figures, namely Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum³.

2 This is a particular concept of the capability approach and used to refer to various dimensions/aspects of the good life in the relevant literature.

3 Both Nussbaum (2000, pp.11-15; 2011a, pp.17-21) and Robeyns (2003, pp.68-70; 2005a, pp.103-105) comprehensively discuss about differences, as well as similarities, between these two perspectives.

Sen's capability approach is a theoretical departure from the evaluative frameworks of certain theories of social justice such as utilitarianism, libertarianism, and Rawlsian models of social justice, where people's (dis)advantages are primarily assessed in terms of "utility" (e.g. subjective well-being, desire fulfilment), "entitlements" (e.g. rights to acquisition and holding of property), or possession of "social primary goods" (e.g. varied forms of resources), respectively. Critically approaching to such theories of social justice, Sen's capability approach simply, *albeit* convincingly, claims that a person's (dis)advantage depends not only what s/he possesses (e.g. income, commodities or entitlements) but how much s/he can substantively make use of her/his possession(s) in practice. Individuals' resources, or possessions that one holds, are only means to achieve a good life or valued ends. The assessment of one's (dis)advantage, therefore, cannot be restricted with her/his ownership of resources, but should be extended so as to include if s/he can make use of her/his resources to achieve what s/he has reason to value in line with her/his own conception of good life. Sen (1983, p.160) illustrates the significance of this view by an example of bike ownership. The value of a bike is not, in essence, associated with its ownership, but rather in what its characteristic affords, *viz.*, transportation or mobility. This means that possession of a bike is significant as long as it enables the owner's movement from one place to another. Here Sen's capability approach distinguishes the means of a person's advantage (e.g. bike) from the functions of these means (e.g. being mobile). In Sen's capability approach, functions of means are conceptualised as *functionings* reflecting "the various things a person may value doing or being" (Sen, 1999a, p.75) such as having shelter, being mobile, educated, healthy, employed, respected, loved and so forth. Instead of placing the resource ownership at the centre of assessment, Sen's capability approach advocates assessing people's (dis)advantage in terms of their freedom, or capability, to achieve functionings that they have reason to value. However, Sen also recognises that different people may have different conceptions of good life, which is identified as "inter-end variation" (Sen, 1990a, p.120; 1992, p.85) among people; and he therefore does not identify what functionings are valuable. Hence, he advocates that people themselves should be in charge of identification of what functionings are valuable for their own lives. Among other things such as the untouchable nature of the individuals' choice that I will discuss further below, attaining authority to people in identifying what functionings are valuable also aligns with the politically and ethically liberal nature of Sen's capability approach that recognises the significance of people's freedom to form their own ends and lifestyles (see Sen, 2009, p.233 and pp.237-238).

However, in addition to politically and ethically liberal nature of Sen's capability approach that respects individuals' own preference in forming their own

good life, there some other reasons behind Sen's eschewal from specifying what functionings makes one's life good. First of all, the plurality of people's values and their different (as well as contending) conceptions of the good make arriving at a universal consensus on the dimensions of good life impossible. As Qizilbash (2002, p.468) emphasizes, Sen wants the capability approach to be compatible with the different conceptions of the good life that different people with different value sets and objectives hold. One way to achieve this is to specify the "space of value", rather than the "object of value". To illustrate, those who have different conceptions of what the good is may disagree about the constituents of the good life; yet they may agree that a good life is the one in which they can live in accordance with their own conception of the good. So, an agreement among people who have different conceptions of the good can be established if the agreement is sought in the "space of value" (e.g. freedom), rather than the "object of value" (e.g. having a religious or secular lifestyle). From this point of view, it becomes evident why Sen's capability approach "pause(s) at outlining a general approach, with various bits to be filled in" (Sen, 1993, p.48) and avoids proposing a complete and concrete list of various objects of value. Secondly, according to Sen, the capability approach is not a complete theory of the just society. But, it is an evaluative framework in which well-being, quality of life, (dis)advantage, or development can be critically assessed in terms of people's freedom to achieve what they have reason to value. Robeyns (2005b, pp.195-196) notes that Sen "wants to advance the capability approach as a general approach to the evaluation of individual advantage and social arrangements and not as a well-defined theory of, for example, the good life or constitutional principles". Thirdly, Sen puts forward an epistemological argument that is associated with the limits of "pure theory". According to him, a pure theory that is completely detached from everyday experiences of social reality (a theory of good life developed from a transcendental philosophical account) "cannot 'freeze' a list of capabilities for all societies all time to come" (Sen, 2005, p.158; 2004, p.78); and thus, expecting such an accomplishment from a theory is a misunderstanding of what theory can (and cannot) do. Based on such reasons, Sen avoids from specifying what makes one's life good (e.g. dimensions of good life, or functionings) and advocates that specification of constituents of good life should be a social choice exercise, meaning that people themselves should be in charge of specifying what matters in their lives. Therefore, he frequently emphasizes that people must be given the opportunity of "shaping their own destiny" (Sen, 1999a, p.53). This leads him to propose "public discussion" (Sen, 2009, pp.241-243) as a method of specification of constituents of good life and to underline the significance of political freedoms in this process of specification (see Sen, 1999a, pp.147-157; and Alkire, 2002, pp.129-137). Briefly, the deliberate

incompleteness of Sen's capability approach is ethically, theoretically, practically, and epistemologically reasoned. Similarly, his proposal concerning the method of specifying the constituents of good life, namely the method of public discussion, is underpinned by his emphasis on the intrinsic value of democracy (see Sen, 1999b, p.10), instrumental value of public discussion⁴ in allowing people to raise their voice (see Sen, 1999a, p.152; 2009, pp.338-345), and pragmatically positive outcomes of public discussion in leading societies to form new values, such as values acknowledging existing gender inequalities (see Sen, 2009, p.242).

Contrary to Sen's perspective that considers the just society as the one where people are able to achieve what they have reason to value⁵ to be and do, Nussbaum claims that Sen's conception of freedom is too vague and that if the capability approach has anything to say about (in)justice, then it must specify what beings and doings are valuable, rather than leaving the task of specification to people themselves. According to Nussbaum, "one cannot have a conception of social justice that says, simply, 'all citizens are entitled to freedom understood as capability'" (Nussbaum, 2003, p.46). This is because, Nussbaum claims, "some freedoms limit others, some freedoms are important, some trivial, some good, and some positively bad" (Ibid., p.33).

In fact, Nussbaum has been stating this criticism since mid-1980s when Sen has already advanced his capability approach as a perspective that widely rests on a criticism of the utilitarian understanding of individual's well-being. Drawing on Sen's criticism of utilitarianism, Nussbaum criticizes Sen himself and claims that:

Suppose we observe, as Sen has, that females in certain poor regions of India suffer from diseases of malnutrition in greater numbers than males do, and thus are less capable of various functionings requiring mobility and vigour. This pattern is the result of traditional distributional inequalities, bolstered by the culturally learned values. Let us say that, when questioned, these women not only say that they feel good and are doing well. (This, we recall, is what in fact they do say.) Let us say that, they make a more sophisticated answer: that, according to their deeply held conceptions of value, a lower level of capability in these areas of life is what it is right and good for a woman to attain. (...) Sen takes

4 Note that Sen does not have a narrow conception of democracy that is confined with electoral politics. He frequently emphasizes the "messiness" (1999a, p.79) and "demanding" (Ibid., p.10) nature of the democratic decision-making. In the *India: Development and Participation*, Dréze and Sen provide a vague account concerning the basic requirements of democratic decision-making process (see Dréze and Sen, 2002, p.347).

5 I critically discussed about Sen's proposal to focus on what people have "reason to value" which he calls as "scrutinized valuation" (see Sen, 2006, p.92) elsewhere (see Arun, 2016a and 2018). To avoid from complicating the discussion ongoing in this piece, I will leave out that discussion here.

their case to show the deficiency of approaches to distribution that are based upon desire and satisfaction; well and good. (...) Just as people can be taught not to want or miss the things their culture has taught then they should not or could not have, so too they can be taught not to value certain functionings as constituents of their good living (Nussbaum, 1988, pp.175-176).

Here, Nussbaum directs Sen's own criticism of the utilitarian metric to Sen himself by underlying the similarity between utilitarian metric of "desire-fulfilment" and Sen's proposal that considers the just society as the one where people are capable, or free, to achieve what they have reason to "value". In other words, Nussbaum underlines the similarity between "individuals' desires" and "individuals' values" both of which, she argues, can be manipulated or distorted by social conditions surrounding people's lives, such as their cultures. Thus, contrary to Sen, Nussbaum (2003, p.34) claims that we must be willing to specify "fundamental entitlements that are to some extent independent of the preferences that people happen to have, preferences shaped, often, by unjust background conditions"; and drawing on an interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of human dignity (see Nussbaum, 2000, pp.72-74; 2003, p.40), she specifies 10 "central human capabilities"⁶. She claims that these capabilities are valuable cross-culturally and allow people to function in a "truly human way" to fulfil their human potential. According to her, without these capabilities, human life would be "too lacking, too impoverished, to be human at all" (Nussbaum, 1995, p.80). Nussbaum proposes her list of central human capabilities, as it is something "pre-political", like human rights conventions. In other words, Nussbaum proposes these capabilities as dimensions of good life that are "inherent in people's very humanity" (Nussbaum, 2011b, p.26); and, in her account, everyone must hold these capabilities to pursue a dignified life.

Individual's Choice and Nussbaum's Unjustified Tacit Assumption⁷

Nussbaum's criticism of Sen's deliberate incompleteness relies upon a sociologically-informed understanding of actor whose (de)valuation of a functioning is influenced by various social conditions/constraints. Referring that people's valuation is

6 These are (1) life; (2) bodily health; (3) bodily integrity; (4) senses, imagination, and thought; (5) emotions; (6) practical reason; (7) affiliation; (8) other species; (9) play; and (10) control of one's environment (see Nussbaum, 2000, pp.78-80; 2007, p.76; 2011a, pp.33-34).

7 I have presented an earlier and slightly unrefined form of the argument as well as the data given below in the International Conference on Contemporary Women's Studies (see Arun, 2019) and also discussed on them in a previous work of mine (see Arun, 2016b) which was in Turkish. However, I here provide a reformulation of the argument by deepening it in a way that does not only address the influence of the social structure on individual's choice of values, but also conceptualises individuals' adaptation as the "ability to make a living within constraining conditions".

a socially conditioned/constrained valuation that can derive from various sources of information such as norms, culture, tradition, religion, or ideology, she argues that what people deem valuable (or, not valuable) can be unreliable for the specification/identification of dimensions of good life. This is because, within the structure of unjust social conditions or background inequalities, these sources of information can play a manipulating or distorting role in the process of people's (de)valuation concerning what make their life good, and eventually lead them to choose some functionings that can play a detrimental role in the formation of what make their life truly good. In other words, just like formation of desires and preferences, people's values are also socially conditioned, which can lead them to value some functionings in line with what they have been taught is right to be and do although these functionings can play a detrimental role in the formation of a truly good life. Based on such a perspective, Nussbaum points out an inherent shortcoming in Sen's theory⁸, claiming that what people value can be shaped by various unjust social conditions, such as their culture, embedded in their lives, which makes their values a potentially unreliable source of information for the purpose of specification of valuable functionings. Nussbaum, who primarily rests on the idea that Sen's proposal of "leaving the specification of valuable functionings to people themselves" overlooks potentially detrimental roles, or adverse effects, of unjust social conditions on people's (de)valuation, rightfully diagnoses an inherent shortcoming in Sen's proposal; however, her diagnosis can hardly be a justification for the necessity of identifying a normative set of functionings whose achievements are still left to people's own choice.

To underpin this argument, I should first of all remind the core characteristic of the capability approach in which *individual's choice*, in not only Sen's version of the approach but Nussbaum's version too, is considered something like the holy grail of the approach and occupies a central place. In other words, *individual's choice*, or her/his freedom to achieve valuable opportunities, is considered as the foundational, and irrefutable, characteristic of the capability approach. This is explicitly observed in Sen's version of the approach where he distinguishes the concept of "functioning" from what he calls as "capability" through an hypothetical example that compares (dis)advantage of two individuals one of who starves due to inability to access adequate nourishment whilst the other person's starvation is due to her/his choice of fasting. According to Sen, the person starving due to her/his choice of fasting and the other person starving due to absence of food are similar in outcome,

8 To be fair, I should underline that Sen is in fact well-aware about social conditioning of people's preferences. His primary criticism to the utilitarian understanding of individual well-being is established on social conditioning of people's preferences. I will discuss this below in more a detailed fashion.

or non-achievement of functioning of being adequately nourished; however, their advantages considerably vary, since fasting is not simply starving but “is choosing to starve when one does have other option” (Sen, 1992, p.52; see also Sen, 2009, pp.236-237). Sen convincingly illustrates the significance of individual’s choice in the capability approach, or advantage of having additional option (see Sen, 1985a, p.49), even though this perspective brings forth quite ample methodological and operational complications in the application of the capability approach as various scholars in the literature have already pointed out (see Zimmerman, 2006, p.478; Comim, 2008, pp.173-176; Walby, 2012, pp.105-106)⁹.

Individual’s capability, or her/his ability to make choice, is not only the ultimate concern of Sen’s capability approach. Similar to his perspective, it also occupies a foundational place in Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach. In her much-quoted work, *Women and Human Development* (2000), she expresses that

A deeply religious person may prefer not to be well nourished, but to engage in strenuous fasting. Whether for religious or for other reasons, a person may prefer a celibate life to one containing sexual expression. A person may prefer to work with an intense dedication that precludes recreation and play. Am I declaring, by my very use of the list, that such lives are not worthy of the dignity of the human being? And am I instructing government to nudge or push people into functioning of the requisite sort, no matter what they prefer?

It is important that the answer to this question is no. Where adult citizens are concerned, *capability, not functioning, is the appropriate political goal*. (Nussbaum, 2000, p.87). (Emphasises are original).

In above quotation, it can be observed that Nussbaum, aligning with the liberal conception of individual’s freedom and good life, underlines that the ultimate concern is people’s capability to pursue, or choose, their own understanding of good life, or their freedom to choose their own course life. In her more recent works, she accentuates the significance of individual freedom/capability to make choice again and says:

All the central capabilities (...) are best seen as occasions for choice, areas of freedom: thus a person can have all ten capabilities on my list without using all

9 I offered a methodological perspective to overcome difficulty of assessing individual’s (dis)advantage based on, not her/his achieved functionings, but capability through exploring her/his costs of functioning achievement elsewhere (see Arun, 2016a and 2018). However, I will leave this perspective aside to not interrupt the discussion ongoing in this work.

of them, and this is true of rights as well. A person may have the right to religious freedom, for example, in a secure form, and care nothing about religion (...). In this way [*the capabilities approach*] avoids being “imperialistic”, or imposing a single lifestyle on all (Nussbaum, 2011b, pp.28-29) (see also Nussbaum, 2000, p.101; 2011a, p.25). (Emphasis are added).

It can explicitly be seen above that individual’s choice is an untouchable characteristic of Nussbaum version of the capability approach too. Based on this, we can say that if a person, who is fully entitled with and capable of achieving Nussbaum’s list of functionings, chooses not to achieve them for reasons of belief (say, due to religion), learning (say, through traditions), adaptation (say, during upbringing), or certain norms (say, patriarchy), then there is nothing to do about this person’s disadvantaged choice in the framework of Nussbaum’s approach. This is because we cannot intervene in people’s choice of what to (not) achieve in the framework of her approach. However, she was the one who justifies the idea that specification of valuable functionings should not be left to people themselves due to detrimental/adverse effects of unjust social conditions on their choices. So, does she believe that adverse/detrimental effects of unjust social conditions are only limited to people choice of values (dimensions of good life, or functionings), but not to their choice of what to (not) achieve? If this is so, she must explain us why does she consider that unjust social conditions are merely influential on people choice of values, but not on their choice of what to (not) achieve. On the other hand, if she agrees on that unjust social conditions can affect people’s both choice of values and what to (not) achieve, then she should develop a further justification for how the specification of valuable functionings from an extrinsic normative philosophical account can prevent people to make socially conditioned detrimental choices in achievement of these functionings and guarantee them a good life.

Assume, for example, that Vasanti and Jayamma, two poor oppressed women to whom Nussbaum interviewed while specifying her list of functionings (Nussbaum, 2000, pp.15-24), consciously choose not to draw on one of Nussbaum’s functionings, say “being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life” (Ibid., p.80), since this is what they have been taught during years of patriarchal oppression, religious indoctrination, or traditional domination. In such a circumstance, Nussbaum’s perspective cannot offer anything to deal with the disadvantaged choice of Vasanti and Jayamma due to the recognition of their choice in achievement of this functioning. Thus, specification of this functioning from an extrinsic normative philosophical account of good life cannot be a solution to Vasanti and Jayamma’s unjust social conditions and guarantee them a better

life¹⁰. Therefore, Nussbaum should find out another reason to justify why we should be willing to specify valuable functionings from an extrinsic normative account of good life to people's actual life.

Briefly, as long as Nussbaum recognizes the central place of the individual's choice, she cannot wipe away the adverse/detrimental effects of unjust social conditions by merely entitling people with a list of functionings developed from an extrinsic normative philosophical account to their actual lives. This is because adverse/detrimental effects of unjust social conditions can demonstrate themselves in not only what people (de)value, but what they choose to (not) achieve as well. Based on this, it can be argued that Nussbaum's claim (which advocates the specification of functionings from an extrinsic normative philosophical account due to adverse/detrimental effects of unjust social conditions on people's choice) involves an unjustified assumption supposing that people who are adversely influenced by unjust social conditions in choosing what to value are immune to these adverse/detrimental effects in choosing to achieve valued beings and doings. If a person has adapted a certain way of life in compliance with her/his community's way of life (say, patriarchal norms), this adaptation will not only shape what s/he (de)values, it will also shape her/his choice of what to (not) achieve. Thus, entitling people with a certain list of functionings developed from an extrinsic normative philosophical account cannot be a solution to the problem that arises from the adverse/detrimental effects of unjust social conditions in Nussbaum's understanding of the capability approach too. Therefore, she needs another justification for her claim that we must specify "fundamental entitlements that are to some extent independent of the preferences that people happen to have, preferences shaped, often, by unjust background conditions" (Nussbaum, 2003, p.34).

Adaptive Preferences and Social Conditioning of Values

In the literature of the capability approach, a particular form of social conditioning of people's values, aspirations, desires, preferences, or objectives is often conceptualized as the question of adaptive preferences. Similar to this, in the literature of sociology of inequalities, a consequence of persistent inequalities is pointed out as that disadvantaged people iteratively experience a coercion that they must downgrade their

10 In fact, such a circumstance can analytically be dealt with way much better in Sen's version of the capability approach where conversion factors are given a substantial place. For example, addressing the social norm that has taught Vasanti and Jayamma drawing on a political functioning is something adequate only for men, but not for women, we can have an opportunity to evaluate how this "established pattern of behaviour" (see Sen, 1999a, p.71; and 2009, p.255) in their community prevents them to convert this political freedom into achievement of good life.

aspirations, expectations, and/or objectives (or demands from the political authority) to what they believe feasible or accessible/achievable within the given conditions of various social and institutional constraints. For the capability approach, this well-known sociological finding brings forth the question of adaptive preference that is, according to some leading figures of the approach, is a “can of worms” (Robeyns, 2006, p.373).

Recalling an example of famous fable where a fox driven by hunger sees some grapes hanging high on a vine but cannot reach them whatever it tries and then persuades itself that the grapes have been sour anyway, Jon Elster (1982, p.219) refers to phenomenon of sour grapes as “adaptive preference formation”. Briefly saying, the concept of adaptive preferences that has largely been popularised by Elster in contemporary economic and political theory refers to the process of preference formation where people change or modify their preferences in relation to various constraints that surround them or what they consider as something more accessible. In the capability literature, adaptive preferences are addressed both (1) as a justification of the capability approach against utilitarian models of justice and (2) as a drawback for the application of the approach. To exemplify, addressing the influence of unjust conditions on people’s desires and preferences (Sen, 1979, p.202, p.208 and p.218; 1985a, pp.12-17; 1985b, pp.188-191; 1985c, pp.14-15 and p.20; 1987, pp.45-46; 1990b, p.126 and p.127; 1999a, pp.62-63), Sen argues that utilitarian metrics of well-being (e.g. desire fulfilment, happiness, subjective well-being or satisfaction) cannot be an adequate basis to assess people’s (dis)advantages because people’s desires and preferences can easily be deformed via, for example, “social conditioning” (1985a, p.12), “the opium of religion” (1985b, p.188), the “established order” and individuals’ “resigned acceptance of misfortune” (1990b, p.127 and p.133), or “harsh reality” (1999a, p.15). He also stresses that:

A person who has had a life of misfortune, with very limited opportunities, and rather little hope, may be more easily reconciled to deprivations than others reared in more fortunate and affluent circumstances. The metric of happiness may, therefore, distort the extent of deprivation, in a specific and biased way (Sen, 1987, p.45).

For this perspective, people’s desires, aspirations or preferences that are adapted to restraining conditions are not a reliable object of value to assess their well-being. In this regard, “the problem of adaptive preferences is at the heart of the justification for the use of the capability approach” (Teschl and Comim, 2005, p.230). On the other hand, as Nussbaum emphasizes, there is no clear-cut difference between what is called as “preference”, “desire”, “aspiration” and what the capability approach calls as “value”. Therefore, Sen’s criticism of the utilitarian metric of (dis)advantage

“can be made with equal force and validity against to a metric based on agency goal” (Burchardt, 2009, p.3) that is valued beings and doings. So, disadvantaged people, who are characterised as “hopeless destitute”, “the tamed housewife” or “the broken unemployed” by Sen (1985a, p.17), could form not only their preferences or aspirations but also values via the “opium of religion”, by “disciplined ends” or in relation to “socially conditioned aspirations”. Thus, the question of adaptive preferences is not only “at the heart of justification for the use of the capability approach”, but it is “a continuing problem for the use of it” (Watts, 2009, p.425) as well.

I agree that the problem of adaptive preferences may become a serious obstacle for the application of the capability approach, especially in the specification of what people should be able to be and do (in other words, in the specification of functionings that people should be substantially free to achieve) when the approach is drawn on to promote social justice. The problem of adaptive preferences in the capability literature, however, is sometimes mistakenly conceived as something akin to the idea of *false-consciousness* and addressed to suggest that disadvantaged people cannot critically reflect on their own circumstances since they lack the ability for sophisticated or reasoned judgements. Such a conception of the problem of adaptive preferences leads analysts, researchers, or philosophers to a pre-assumption that they need to specify valuable functionings (what people should be able to be and do) from a normative philosophical account of the good life. Thus, such conception eventually ignores the significance of exploring why, as well as how, people adjust their preferences in relation to constraining social conditions and locks the researchers and philosophers in ivory towers. However, the essence of the problem in terms of the capability approach is primarily about how disadvantaged people adjust their preferences to what they consider as “accessible” within given social, economic, cultural, and/or institutional constraints. This does not necessarily mean that they have a *false-consciousness* on what sort of material circumstances could have made their lives a good life, or that they are deprived of the *ability for sophisticated/reasoned judgements or critical reflections* on what could have made their lives a good life. In other words, the problem of adaptive preferences refers, not necessarily to a person’s deprivation from the ability of critical reflection, sophisticated deliberation, or reasoned judgements on what makes her/his life good, but to a preference formation process in which s/he downgrades her/his preferences to the accessible options within given social, economic, cultural, and/or institutional constraints.

The way Nussbaum addresses the problem of adaptive preferences illustrates such a conception of the problem of adaptive preferences in which disadvantaged people are seen as those who lack the capacity/ability for sophisticated/reasoned judgements or critical reflection on what could have possibly made their lives a

truly good human life. To illustrate, in *Women and Human Development* (2000), one full-chapter titled *Adaptive Preferences and Women's Option* is allocated for the question of adaptive preferences, and she starts her discussion with the following examples:

Think, once again, of Vasanti and Jayamma. Vasanti stayed for years in an abusive marriage. Eventually she did leave, and by now she has very firm views about the importance of her bodily integrity. (...) But there was a time when Vasanti *did not think* this way (...). The idea that it was a violation of rights, of law, of justice, and that she herself has rights that are being violated by her husband's conduct – these ideas she didn't have at that time, and many many women all over the world don't have them now (Nussbaum, 2000, pp.112-113). (Emphasis added)

When women were paid less for heavier work at the brick kiln and denied chances for promotion, Jayamma didn't complain or protest. She *knew that this was how things were and would be*. (...) Unlike Vasanti, Jayamma seemed to lack not only the concept of herself as a person with rights that could be violated, but also the sense that what was happening to her was a wrong (Ibid., p.113). (Emphasis added)

In the desert area outside Mahabubnagar, Andhra Pradesh, I talked with women who were severely malnourished, and whose village had no reliable clean water supply. Before the arrival of a government consciousness-raising program, these women apparently had no feeling of anger or protest about their physical situation. They *knew no other way*. They *did not consider their conditions* unhealthful or unsanitary, and they *did not consider* themselves to be malnourished (Ibid.). (Emphasis added)

Here the problem of adaptive preferences is conceived as a problem of the absence of one's ability to develop a critical reflection or sophisticated/reasoned judgements on what makes her/his life good, or one's inability to be aware of her/his own true interests. And, it is this conception of the adaptive preferences that leads Nussbaum to advocate the necessity of developing a normative philosophical account of good life that is extrinsic to people's own live. However, there are two problems in such conception of the adaptive preferences. The first problem is that Nussbaum makes an overgeneralization based on views of Vasanti, Jayamma, and women in Andhra Pradesh; and she discusses like these women's inability, if so, to develop critical reflection or sophisticated/reasoned judgement on their own circumstances is also applicable to all disadvantaged people. However, being disadvantaged does not necessarily mean being unable to develop sophisticated/reasoned judgements and critical reflections on material circumstances. For example, drawing on some participatory empirical research Clark (2009, p.25) argues that "the available evidence from studies of human values (for example, Alkire, 2002; Clark, 2002b; Clark and Qizilbash, 2008) and participatory poverty assessments (for example, Narayan *et al*, 2000; Narayan and Petesch, 2002) indicates that the poor and deprived

are capable -and arguably just as capable as anyone else- of making rationale judgments and choices". Qizilbash (2006, pp.100-101) also stress that disadvantaged people can make very sophisticated/critical judgements on their conception of the good life, again referring to empirical research. The second problem is about Nussbaum's conception of adaptive preferences. She discusses on the problem of adaptive preferences in a way that disadvantaged people cannot critically reflect on their own circumstances or develop a sophisticated/reasoned judgement on what makes their life good. Some existing empirical evidences suggest that disadvantaged people can adapt their preferences to restrained conditions, not because they lack the ability for critical reflection on their own circumstances, but because of structural constraints that lead them to adapt their preferences to their unjust conditions. For instance, Agarwal (2008, pp.165-166) provides some examples where oppressed women in South Asia struggle with their disadvantages through various covert ways and argues that the covert ways through which disadvantaged women struggle with their constraints "reflect a survival strategy stemming from the constraints on their ability to pursue those interests overtly", but not the "lack of a perception of their best interests" (Ibid., p.166, see also Agarwal, 1997, pp.23-25). As Agarwal argues, these findings suggest that the main problem in people's adaptation of preferences is not that they are unable to make critical judgments but rather the structural constraints that coerce them to adjust their preferences. These empirical findings underpin the fact that there is a need for paying more attention to the role of social and institutional constraints/injustices when dealing with how disadvantaged people form their preferences, rather than the claim that disadvantaged people are deprived from sophisticated/reasoned judgements on what could have made their lives a good life.

Below, drawing on the empirical data derived from narratives of some disadvantaged people that I interviewed, I argue that the problem of adaptive preferences occurs, not because disadvantaged people are unable to make sophisticated/reasoned judgements, but rather this is because of the only way to deal with their constraining conditions, which in fact illustrates their ability to make a living within the given unjust social structure surrounding their lives.

Sophisticated/Reasoned Judgements and the Ability to Make a Living Within Constraining Conditions

The empirical research underpinning the argument in this work has been conducted between December, 2012 and April, 2013¹¹ in Turkey's three distinctive settings,

11 With the purpose of gaining a comprehensive insight concerning narratives of interviewees and relating these narratives to the contextual characteristics of selected milieus, I have exclusively allocated the

namely Diyarbakir, Konya, and Izmir. Selection of these social contexts was primarily motivated by the rationale that empirical process of data collection in social research should be compatible with conceptual and normative frameworks that the research draws on for the analysis of a social phenomenon. In this regard, considering that the capability approach normatively advocates that the just society is the one where people who have varied conceptions of good life can achieve what they have reason to value, it turned into a methodological necessity to choose social contexts where dominant values of majority, their ways of living, and conceptions of good life vary. However, the same rationale that governed the process of social contexts selection was also adopted for the interviewee recruitment process in this research. In this regard, adopting a purposive sampling method for interviewee recruitment was an inevitable necessity to ensure compatibility of the conceptual and normative frameworks of the capability approach with the empirical data collection process. Following this rationale, during the empirical research, I talked to individuals whose social characteristics are diverse in terms of their ethnicity, political attitude and belonging, religious belonging as well as degree of religiosity, economic and occupational status, gender, age, and educational degree. Drawing on a qualitative method of data collection, particularly semi-structured in-depth interviews, I interviewed 42 individuals mostly in their home. During the interviews that usually lasted between two and two and a half hours, I particularly aimed to explore three subjects through quite a number questions related to participants' everyday practices and ways of life:

1. The contextual and socially constructed reasonings and meanings of what they value
2. The role of socially embedded factors that influence their ability to achieve what they value and how they operate when they attempt to achieve what they value
3. The varied social processes that people pass through in achieving what they value

The data I draw on in this work, however, is only a part of the broader research whose foundational details are briefly provided just above. Even though the entire data of the broader research has aimed to provide quite an extensive information for various ongoing discussions in the literature of the capability approach as well as social justice, here I only provide the empirical findings related to the primary argument of this particular work. In this regard, I below provide detailed accounts

first one month of data collecting process for observations in the selected milieus. Methodologically speaking, such observational process was quite helpful to gain a deeper familiarity of the social contexts where the data collection process took place. But, beyond this, it turned the systematic interviewing process into a quite proliferous one.

of two disadvantaged participants only to underpin the arguments that (1) disadvantaged people are not necessarily those who are deprived from the ability of sophisticated/reasoned judgements in valuational practices, and (2) the problem of adaptative preferences is not necessarily a problem of false consciousness, but of structural constraints which can compel disadvantaged people to develop the ability to make a living within the given unjust social constraints.

The first person who had to adapt his preferences to the constraining relations of social structure was a participant who was a middle-aged and low-income male covertly supporting the main opposition party in Konya where is known as the citadel of the right-wing and religiously conservative ruling party in Turkey. When I interviewed the participant who believed that “if you want to get things done, you have to *have an uncle*¹²”, he had managed to be employed with a temporary contract in a new factory by practically and wisely developing some ways of hiding his political identity and pretending like he was not a supporter of the main opposition party as well as republican values that are mostly against the religiously conservative ones in Turkey. Although his employer had to insure him by law for his health expenditures from the date he started to work, he was still not insured. After he complained about cost of accessing health services, I asked him what would have made it easier; and he spoke of the value of “having a relative or a close acquaintance” who works in the hospital and who could make it easier and less costly to access health services via personal connections. Without any further inquiry, we might say that “having a relative or close acquaintance” working in the hospital is a valuable means that can facilitate the participant’s functioning achievement of accessing health services. But, why did he not complain that his employer did not fulfil the legal requirement of insuring him? Instead of valuing having a proper health insurance in the first place¹³, why did he value having a relative or close acquaintance working in the hospital instead? What made him adapt this preference? One way to answer these questions, similar to Nussbaum’s perspective, could be the argument, for example, that he was unable to critically reflect on his own disadvantaged circumstances and thus unable to make an informed or rational decision about the right/good thing to value. Or, in a similar vein, it could also be claimed that choosing to value “having a relative or close acquaintance” to facilitate accessing health services is preferred by him instead of

12 *Having an uncle* is a phrase indicating to have some personal connection with someone who is in a high place and uses her/his position to favour for acquaintances.

13 I should note that having insurance in fact was not something the participant devalued. However, in terms of accessing to health services in an easier and less costly way, the first thing he addressed as a need was “having a relative or acquaintance”.

having a proper health insurance since he has a false-consciousness and is not aware about what his true interest is. However, a deeper sociological inquiry allows us to see a sophisticated/reasoned judgement in his valuation that is primarily formed by various social and institutional dynamics as well as constraints. For example, when he complained about health costs and said he was not insured, I reminded him that this was unlawful and he could insist that his employer should have insured him when he started to work. Yet, he said “he would give me the boot if I insist”, which indicates his weakness in the face of his employer. I asked if he was a member of any trade union through which he could have strengthened his position while demanding his due. He responded that if there were any union actively protecting his rights in the workplace, he would like to be a member. Following this, I asked him whether he could have at least appealed to the Ministry of Labour and complained about unlawful employment conditions. But, according to him, I was talking nonsensical.

You talk like you had not lived here [Turkey] at all. (...) [Because] This would be senseless. (...) Of course, I would like to [have insurance]. Why didn't I? (...) Okay. Say that I called [the Ministry]. What could happen? (...) Nothing. At most, it would send an inspector. (...) No, nothing would change. Inspectors are corrupt. They are grafters. Don't you know? (...) Say that, he [the inspector] came. He would directly pass to the boss's room. He would have a glass of tea with the boss. Then the boss would slip him a bit [of money] under the counter. Then, he would write a slapdash report and leave.

His narrative addresses several contextual constraints that led him to form his preference as “having a relative or close acquaintance” to facilitate his accession to health services. These constraints include being unable to work in a properly regulated labour market where his rights were protected, being unable to sign up to a trade union that could empower him in front of the employer, and being unable to seek his rights through uncorrupted executive bodies. Due to these constraints, he had no other option, but to adapt his preference to the constraining conditions he was surrounded with. His valuation demonstrates the formation of a preference in relation to unjust/constraining social conditions; however, this can hardly be addressed as a preference formed due to his inability of making a critical reflection on constraining circumstances. Rather, he took notice of various contextual constraints and adopted such a particular preference, which explicitly demonstrates that he was able to make a sophisticated and reasoned judgement. More importantly, this judgement illustrates an ability developed due to constraining social conditions such as inefficacy in enforcement of certain laws in the labour market, absence of an effective labour union in his workplace and lawful execution of inspection duties by assigned officials.

Another example of adaptation of a preference due to contextual constraints is the case of a female participant, a very poor, uneducated and married Kurdish person living in Diyarbakir where patriarchal norms are quite dominant and effective in both public and private spheres. When I interviewed her, she had two small children and was, similar to her husband, unemployed. She was living in one of the poorest neighbourhood of her city where solidarity relations between neighbours were vital to make a living. When I asked what the most pressing issue in her life, she pointed to her husband's unemployment rather than her own. Considering her choice of signifying her husband's unemployment as the most pressing issue instead of her own unemployment, it could perhaps be argued that she had already internalised a patriarchal division of labour within household and thus prioritised her husband's employment status. Based on this, it could even further be argued that her choice demonstrates an absence of critical reflection on her own life since such a choice places opportunities available to herself at an inferior position *vis-à-vis* opportunities available to her husband. However, such an argument would be lacking since it would be based on a understanding that evaluates her choice in a way detached from her social relations with others in her setting. This can be observed in her respond to my question that what would possibly be happen if she and her husband changed roles within the household and her husband was responsible for housekeeping as well as caring activities whilst she worked outside:

Participant: No, this wouldn't happen [be good].

Researcher: Why not?

Participant: There would be rumour, gossip...

Researcher: Who would do that? Neighbours?

Participant: Everyone would. People's mouths are not a bag that you can shirr¹⁴.

Researcher: What would they say, for example?

Participant: They would talk. They would say [to her husband] 'are you not man?', 'Can you not take care of your home [family]?'. They would keep talking.

Researcher: Let them talk. You do not have to care...

Participant: No, you should [care]. Why do you become bad [with neighbours]? (...) When you are in trouble, when you are in need of something, what do you do? You knock your neighbour's door. Who does want to be in bad with neighbours?

Her narrative refers to the potential humiliation of the head of the family, her husband, if gender roles are reversed in a patriarchal society. Yet, the disadvantage

14 A phrase in Turkish that is similar to the rumour "spreads like wildfire".

in such a case would not only be limited to humiliation, but also might result in a rupture in social relations with others in her setting. On the other hand, when her dependency on the solidarity relations due to her disadvantaged socio-economic status is considered, losing her community's respect by acting against established norms is an unaffordable risk. In this regard, her valuation of her husband's employment *vis-à-vis* hers can be considered as a preference (1) adapted to the established norms of her social context and (2) deliberately reasoned judgement to preserve solidarity relations she is dependent on. Thus, it becomes difficult to argue that she prioritises her husband's employment simply because she was deprived of the ability of making sophisticated/reasoned judgement on what makes her life good. Contrary to this, it is more plausible to argue that she must have developed the abilities of (1) awareness concerning the established norms in her social surrounding and (2) appropriation of a way of life compatible with these norms in order to make a living within such unjust social constraints.

The cases of participants shared above illustrate that disadvantaged people are not necessarily those who are unable to develop sophisticated/reasoned judgements in valuational practices. Choices of disadvantaged people may at first sight seem as irrational choices, outcomes of embracement of inferiority, or even results of false-consciousness for researchers who are practically outsiders to disadvantaged people's actual life experiences. However, such choices of disadvantaged people, as seen in the cases above, can be fruits of quite sophisticated/reasoned judgements that wisely take surrounding conditions into account and be outcomes of an ability that have to be developed to make a living within the given constraining configurations of social relations. Therefore, considering the problem of adaptive preferences as a problem stemming only from the absence of sophisticated/reasoned judgements, or as a problem merely associated with false-consciousness, is an inadequate perspective. It should not be ignored that a person's adaption to her/his constraining conditions can, in some cases, illustrate an ability to make a living within the given conditions of injustices.

Conclusion

Who should be in charge of identifying valuable functionings is a long-standing unresolved question between two pioneers of the capability approach. On the one hand, Amartya Sen advocates the perspective that people themselves should decide what functionings are valuable; and he justifies this perspective ethically, epistemologically, theoretically and practically. On the other hand, Martha Nussbaum criticises Sen's perspective for being too vague, and if the capability approach has

anything to say about (in)justices, then it must specify valuable functionings, rather than leaving this task to people themselves. Nussbaum develops her criticism, both in her early works and more recent ones, by employing a sociologically-informed understanding of social reality that refers to the social conditioning of people's values (such as detrimental/adverse effects of some cultural practices on people's valuation); and proposes a philosophically-informed solution, namely a list of functionings based on a normative philosophical account of a good life inspired from the Aristotelian conception of human dignity. I acknowledge that Nussbaum's diagnosis of the problem that refers to the social conditioning of people's values is a serious challenge for the capability approach. However, in this work, I critically argue that Nussbaum's philosophically-informed solution involves three flaws. First, Nussbaum's diagnosis involves an unjustified and tacit assumption. She specifies 10 valuable functionings from a normative philosophical account of the good life as a solution against the social conditioning of people's values and assumes that this inevitably erases the detrimental/adverse effects of the social conditioning. However, there is no philosophical or theoretical justification to suggest that adverse/detrimental effects of unjust social conditions are merely limited to people's choice of values. Social conditioning is a problem ingrained in one's choice that involves both her/his choice of values and her/his choice of what to achieve. So, if those who are fully-entitled with Nussbaum's list of functionings deliberately choose not to achieve these functionings –due to detrimental/adverse effects of unjust social conditions on their choices– then there is nothing to deal with such socially conditioned choices since Nussbaum herself explicitly ascribes a fundamental place to people's freedom of choice. This is to say that Nussbaum cannot resolve problems stemming from detrimental/adverse effects of unjust social conditions by simply specifying functionings developed from a normative philosophical account of the good life. Therefore, she must find another justification for her claim that we must be willing to specify “fundamental entitlements that are to some extent independent of the preferences that people happen to have, preferences shaped, often, by unjust background conditions” (Nussbaum, 2003, p.34). Secondly, Nussbaum's argument that disadvantaged individuals, such as Vasanti and Jayamma, do not have the ability to develop sophisticated/reasoned judgments or critical reflection on what can possibly make their life good is an excessively generalised argument. Based on findings from her discussions with a limited number of disadvantaged women in India, she arrives at a conclusion that all disadvantaged people on earth are those who “did not think” about their disadvantaged conditions, who considered their disadvantaged conditions as “this was how things were and would be”, who “knew no other way” and “did not consider their conditions unhealthful” (Nussbaum, 2000,

pp.112-113). However, existing empirical evidences demonstrate that some disadvantaged people are capable of approaching their conditions critically and making sophisticated/reasoned judgements. This is to say that being disadvantaged does not necessarily mean being unable to make sophisticated/reasoned judgements or critical reflection on one's material conditions. Thirdly, in Nussbaum's discussion, the problem of adaptive preferences is addressed in a way akin to the concept of false-consciousness. However, existing literature and empirical data I have presented above demonstrate that some disadvantaged groups are capable of evaluating their social, economic and political conditions, and deliberately as well as wisely adapt their preferences to these conditions with the purpose of finding a way to make a living within the given constraints. This is to suggest that disadvantaged groups are not necessarily and always those who are unaware of their true interests, but can in some cases be those who must have developed the ability of adapting their preferences to make a living within the given structural constraints.

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