The epistemic crisis of politics leaves us between two options when it is evaluated in terms of political epistemology: (i) Limiting the talking about the idea of good by claiming that it is impossible to design the public sphere as an epistemic one where political actors can negotiate and compromise on every issue. Or (ii) Settling for the minimum by claiming that it is impossible to build epistemic trust between the parties in the public sphere. The first option argues that negotiating the ideas about good and well-being will eventually lead to conflicts, so this option suggests that keeping quiet about the good would be suitable choice for security reasons. The second option indicates that as long as the problem of mutual epistemic trust between individuals is not resolved, it would be more reasonable to settle for less. However, no matter which of these two options is chosen, it does not seem to be possible to get away from epistemic vices such as epistemic arrogance, epistemic injustice and mythical thinking that deepen the crises of the politics. As far as ignorance of idea of good increases epistemic vices deepen. Epistemic vices distort not only the cognitive process of the individual, but the entire field of politics. This study claims that political actors’ adoption of epistemic humility as an intellectual virtue will alleviate epistemic vices in politics. Humility will make it easier for political actors to realize their epistemic vices, to continue to seek the truth on the issues they are ignorant, and to exchange knowledge about the idea of good by overcoming the problem of mutual trust in deliberation processes.